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THE PRESIDENT AND MILITARY POWER IN
EMERGENCIES
CHARLES McCAMIC*
Military law, as the term is usually understood and applied,
is the code of the soldier, which law is ordinarily found in the
Articles of War. Concomitant with this are the means by which
such military law is enforced, the courts martial. There is
another meaning in which the term "military law" is used: the
military rule exercised by the militia in emergencies. This lat-
ter use may occur in war time, when, of course, the right to do
so is plain. A situation may also arise in peace time in a state
or territory calling for the use of the militia or the army of the
United States. It is in this latter meaning that the term is used
here. May the President proclaim martial law in the area of the
disturbance with the same legality that he could do if war was
an actual fact? And especially may he do so if the civil courts
are open in such disturbed areas? It is not to be doubted that
he may do so in war time in the zone of actual disturbance. The
military rule in such situation is not confined. to the courts mar-
tial nor to the Articles of War.
There have been occasions in times of peace when difficulties
have arisen so serious that the very existence of governments
seemed to be threatened. In such emergencies, the doctrine of
necessity has been invoked to support the power in the govern-
ment. If the power to defend and protect itself is deferred, it
may be too late.
The problem is not new, of course. In 1637 it arose in Great
Britain in the Case of Ship Money.' One John Hampden refused
to pay an extraordinary tax levied for the purchase of war ships.
The power to tax was upheld. The argument of the Lord Chief
Justice, Sir John Finch, is set forth in part in the note.' The
*Member of the Bar, Wheeling, West Virginia, and Lieutenant Colonel,
J. A. G. Reserve.13 How. St. Tr. 825.2 Now, whether a danger be to all the kingdom, or to a part, they are
alike perilous, and all ought to be charged . . . . The king may charge the
subjects for the defence of the land. Now the land and the sea make but
one intire kingdom, and there is but one lord of both, and the king is bound
to defend both . . . . Expectancy of danger, I hold, is sufficient ground for
the king to charge his subjects; for if we stay till the danger comes, it will
be then too late, it may be . . . . His (the king's) averment of the danger
ip not traversable, it must be binding when he perceives and says there is a
1
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18 THE PRESIDENT AND MILITARY POWER
doctrine of this case was later set aside by an act of Parliament.'
The Ship Money Case is known to every student of English his-
tory. (Thus, early arose this present-day mooted question - the
power of the government in times of emergencies, and when the
court then decided in favor of the existence of the power, we have
present the legislative remedy of attempted repeal.)
In 1794 when England was at war with France, a British
subject, one Theobald Wolf Tone, a member of the Irish bar in
Dublin, interested himself favorably in the project of a French
invasion of Ireland. Tone had had a colorful career. He had
taken part in the French revolution. In 1795, he and his family
transported to America. When in sight of Boston, the vessel in
which they had sailed was boarded by a British man-of-war, and
Tone was impressed as a sailor in the British navy. Upon secur-
ing his release, he tendered his services to the French Directory,
and he was commissioned in the French army. This commission
he accepted. Tone was later captured while attempting to land
troops in Ireland. On November 10, 1798, he was brought to
trial before a court martial in Dublin. He was found guilty and
sentenced to be hanged. The execution was set for November 12,
1798. In the interval before the date set for the execution ar-
rived, Tone's father applied for a habeas corpus to the Court of
the King's Bench sitting in Dublin. The ground of the applica-
tion was that war not raging, and the Court of King's Bench
being open, a court martial had no jurisdiction to try; "that mar-
tial law and civil law are incompatible; and that the former must
cease with the existence of the latter."'
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue "instantly",
but because Tone might be executed before the writ could be pre-
pared, the sheriff was directed to proceed to the barracks where
Tone was confined "and acquaint the provost-marshal that a
writ is preparing to suspend Mr. Tone's execution; and see that
he be not executed". The sheriff was refused admission to the
barracks where Tone was confined, the provost-marshal saying,
"he must obey lord Cornwallis". The sheriff so reported to the
King's Bench, and he was ordered to arrest the provost-marshal,
and to "take the body of Tone into your custody". The sheriff
made a second trip to the barracks, and was there informed that
danger; as in 1588, the enemy had been upon us, if it had not been for-
seen, and provided for, before it came."816 Chas. I, c. 14 (1641).
'27 State Trials 614,
2
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Tone had cut his throat and was not in a condition to be removed.
He died a few days later from the self-inflicted wound.
This case of Tone was never decided on the merits, but never-
theless it remains as a landmark in the history of jurisprudence
of a time probably when narrow liberalism ruled the English legal
opinion of the day. The prevailing legal view of that day was
that of the Tone case. It is so expressed by Blackstone, who
grounds his views upon Littleton'
The next period to note is the year 1867 which is unusual
because there arose both in the English courts and in the Supreme
Court of the United States substantially the question presented
in the case of Tone, - whether or not when the civil courts are
open, courts martial have power to try and sentence. The English
courts refused to follow the doctrine of the Tone case, but the
Supreme Court of the United States without citing it, by a five
to four decision followed the Tone doctrine. The English case
arose out of the Jamaica rebellion, where a grand jury refused
to indict army officers for murder, who had carried out orders
of a superior military authority.!
The American case was that of ex parte Milligan."
Milligan, a citizen of Indiana, who had never been in the
military service of the United States, was arrested in Indiana by
order of the Commanding General of that military district,
charged with conspiracy against the government of the United
States, affording aid and comfort to the rebellion, inciting an in-
surrection, etc. The specifications set forth inter alia that /Mll-
gan with others in time of actual war had set on foot a secret
military organization for the purpose of overthrowing the gov-
ernment, and that he had become an officer therein; also that he
had, with others, conspired to seize the United States and State
Arsenals and to release the prisoners of war confined therein and
to arm the prisoners. A trial before a military commission re-
sulted in a finding of guilty with a sentence of death. An appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus was made in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Indiana, which was, on a
division of opinion between the judges, certified to the Supreme
Court. It is a cause celebri. Among the eminent counsel ap-
pearing on both sides was James A. Garfield for the petitioner.
Milligan insisted that the military commission had no jurisdiction
I COMMENTARIES (1768) 413.
0 Queen v. Nelson, (1867) F. Cockburn Rep.
7 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281 (1866).
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20 THE PRESIDENT AND MILITARY POWER
to try him upon the charges, because he was a United States citi-
zen residing in Indiana, wlho had not been a citizen of any other
state since the commencement of the Rebellion, and that he was
guaranteed the right of trial by jury by the Constitution of the
United States.
The court divided five to four, the majority opinion being
written by Air. Justice Davis and the minority by Chief Justice
Chase. Both these Justices were appointees of President Lincoln.
In the majority opinion the question was stated "had the military
commission . . . . jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence him?
Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious states, or a prison-
er-of war, but a citizen of Indiana for twenty years past, and
never in the military or naval service, is, while at his home, ar-
rested by the military power of the United States, imprisoned,
and, on certain criminal charges preferred against him, tried,
convicted, and sentenced to be hanged by a military commission,
organized under the direction of the military commander of the
military district of Indiana. Had this tribunal the legal power
and authority to try and punish this man"?
The majority held that "martial rule" is "confined to the
locality of actual war" and that it "can never exist where the
courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of
their jurisdiction." Milligan therefore, being a civilian, acting
wholly in civilian territory, over which the jurisdiction of the
militia had not attached was not subject to trial by a military
commission. "If armies were collected in Indiana, they were to be
employed in another locality, where the laws were unobstructed
and the national authority disputed. On her soil there was no
hostile foot."
In the able and vigorous dissent, martial law was clearly de-
fined as: "to be exercised in time of invasion or insurrection
within the limits of the United States, or during rebellion within
the limits of states' maintaining adhesion to the National Govern-
ment, when the public danger requires its exercise . . . and is
called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action
of Congress cannot be invited and in the case of justifying or ex-
cusing peril by the President, in times of insurrection or invasion,
or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where or-
dinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and pri-
vate rights."
The fact that the civil courts were open, he thought, was not
4
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controlling because they "might be open and undisturbed in the
execution of their functions, and yet wholly incompetent to avert
threatened danger, or to punish, with adequate promptitude and
certainty, the guilty conspirators".
The decision of the court in the Milligan case has been the
subject of extensive comment. Winthrop in his Military Law
and Precedents! believes the view of minority of tae court "is the
sounder and more reasonable one."
The present Chief Justice, Mr. Hughes, in a paper, War
Powers under the Constitution,' published as a Senate Document,
has very cautiously suggested that "outside the actual theatre
of war, and if, in a true sense, the administration of justice re-
mains unobstructed, the right of the citizen to normal judicial
procedure is secure." In the same paper, Mr. Hughes also com-
ments on the view of the majority opinion in the Milligan case
that martial law cannot arise except where confined to the locality
of actual war, that "certainly, the test should not be a mere
physical one, nor should substance be sacrificed to form. The
majority recognized 'a necessity to furnish a substitute for the
civil authority', when overthrown, in order 'to preserve the safety
of the army and society'. If this necessity actually exists it can-
not be doubted that the power of the Nation is adequate to meet
it, but the rights of the citizen may not be impaired by an ar-
bitrary legislative declaration."
Charles Fairman, of Williams College, in his recent book,
The Law of Martial Rule," says: "There is general agreement that
Justice Davis went too far when he said that martial law cannot
arise from a threatened danger, that the courts and civil admin-
istration must already have been deposed."
Are the expressions of Messrs. Winthrop, Hughes and Fair-
man justified? In arriving at a conclusion, it is submitted that
a careful study should be made, not only of the use of martial
law in the United States, both by authority of the federal gov-
ernment and by that of the States, but also of the eases arising
out of the Boer War, the World War and of the Irish Rebellion
of 1920.
8 (2d ed. 1896), at 817.
'Sen. Doe. No. 105, 65th Congress 1st Session; 42 A. B. A. REP. 232, 246
(1917).
'0(1930), at 145.
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Martial Law in the United States
In .times of public danger and in emergencies, martial law,
as here understood, has been declared by the President and has
been exercised in the United States. Historical exercises of the
power were made in New Orleans by General Jackson on Decem-
ber 16, 1814;' by General Scott in Mexico in 1847; in the Kan-
sas disturbances of 1854-1858; and in the labor strikes of 1877
when Federal troops were sent into the Eastern Panhandle of
West Virginia.
It may not be amiss to refer to some of the other occasions
of the declaration of military law. On July 30, 1866, when a
riot occurred in New Orleans, martial law was declared by the
Department Commander in this language: "in consequence of
the riotous and unlawful proceedings of today, Martial Law is
proclaimed in the City of New Orleans. Brevet Major General
A. U. Kautz is appointed Military Governor of the City. He will
make his Headquarters in the City Hall, and his orders will be
minutely obeyed in every particular. All civil functionaries will
report at once to General Kautz and will be instructed by him
with regard to such duties as they may be hereafter required to
perform. "
In March, 1867, during a flood in the Tennessee River at
Chattanooga, life and property were imperilled, and at the re-
quest of the civil authorities, Captain J. Kline, 25th Infantry,
commanding the post, placed the city under martial law, and
boats were ordered seized by the military for the purpose of mov-
ing household goods.' The Mayor subsequently thanked the post
commander for his services.
"The Jackson proclamation was as follows:
"Major General Andrew Jackson, commanding the seventh United States
military district, declares the city and environs of New Orleans under strict
Martial Law, and orders that in future the following rules be rigidly en-
forced, viz: Every individual entering the city will report to the adjutant
general's office, and on failure, to be arrested and held for examination. No
person will be permitted to leave the city without permission in writing
signed by the General or one of his staff. No vessels, boats, or other craft
will be permitted to leave New Orleans or Bayou St. John without a pass-
port in writing from the General or one of his staff, or the commander of
the naval forces of the United States on this station. The street lamps will
be extinguished at the hour of nine at night, after which time persons of
every description found in the streets, or not at their respective homes,
without permission in writing as aforesaid and not having the countersign,
shall be apprehended as spies and held for examination."
"Gen. Order No. 60, Dept. of La. (1866).
"Gen. Order No. 12, Post of Chattanooga, Tenn. (March 11, 1867).
6
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During the Ku Klux disturbances, the President, in October,
1871, suspended the writ of habeas corpus in certain counties in
South Carolina.
Brigadier General Wilkinson in 1806 commanding in Loui-
siana, suspended the writ of habeas corpus during the Burr con-
spiracy. The Supreme Court, in passing on the question,' ex-
pressed the dictum that the writ could be suspended only by the
legislature, but President Lincoln in Civil War time acted on the
theory that the President had such power.
The Federal authorities acting under the Articles of Con-
federation exercised armed force to put down Shays' levelors in
Massachusetts in 1787; and under the present Constitution, the
Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania in 1794-5.
In 1842 Dorr's rebellion occurred in Rhode Island.
In Luther v. Bordet , the defendants, acting under the
authority of the Rhode Island government, broke into the plain-
tiff's home. This government was operating under a charter
granted by Charles II in 1663, under which Rhode Island was
admitted to the Union. An unauthorized election adopted a new
constitution and Thomas W. Dorr was elected Governor. When
Dorr attempted to act as Governor, the regular government of
Rhode Island resisted; the legislature passed an act declaring the
state under martial law; the militia was called out, and plaintiff,
supporting Dorr, had his home broken into and himself arrested.
In a suit for damages the defendants were justified upon the
ground that actual war was being levied on the state; the state
had declared martial law, and they, being in the military service
of the state, broke the house by command of their superior mili-
tary officer, doing as little damage as possible. Dorr's attempt
was a failure.
This brief review brings us to the later situations growing
out of internal affairs.
Cases in Some of the States
In 1871 the Governors of North Carolina and Tennessee sus-
pended the writ of habeas corpus during the Ku Klux trouble.
In 1892, and subsequently, riots occurred in Coeur d'Alene
mines in Shoshone County, Idaho. The disturbances continued
11 Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cranch 75, 2 L. ed. 554 (1807).
1r 7 How. 1, 12 L. ed. 581 (1849). See also Commonwealth v. Blodgett, 12
Met. 56 (Mass. 1846) and Despan v. Olney, Fed. Cas. No. 3822 (1852),
which arose out of Dorr's rebellion.
7
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for some years. Finally in 1899, the Governor of the State de-
clared the county to be in a state of insurrection and rebellion
and.called on the President to send in troops, which were furnish-
ed. William Boyle was arrested and he applied to the State Su-
preme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied."
Among other things the court said: "We are of the opinion that
whenever, for thipurpose of putting down insurrection or re-
bellion, the exigencies of the case demanded for the successful
accomplishment of this end in view, it is entirely competent for
the executive or for the military officer in command, if there be
such, either to suspend the writ (of habeas corpus) or disregard
it, if issued." (Italics the author's).
During the protracted struggles in Colorado in 1903 and
1904 between the operators and the Western Federation of Miners,
Governor Peabody on several occasions declared martial rule in
certain counties. Charles H. Moyer, President of the Western
Federation, on March 30, 1904, was arrested by the troops, and
imprisoned until June 15, 1904. He applied for a writ of habeas
corpus to be released on bail, which the Supreme Court of Col-
orado declined, and later the petition was dismissed." After the
Governor's term of office had expired, Moyer sued him in the
Federal Court for damages for false imprisonment, alleging that
the imprisonment was without probable cause; that no complaint
was filed against him and that the Colorado courts were open all
the time. The Circuit, Court dismissed the suit on demurrer, and
certified the question of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.'
That Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, unanimously
affirmed, the Circuit .-Court and used language so clear that he
who runs may read :"
. . ... It is admitted, as it must be, that the Governor's
declaration that a state of insurrection existed is conclusive
of that fact ....
1Bz parte Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899).
1t z parte Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 91 Pac. 738 (1905). As recently as 1927
a Colorado case arose in the federal courts, U. S. ex rel. Palmer v. Adams,
26 Fed. (2d) 141 (D. Colo. 1927). Governor Adams declared an insurrection
in two counties and the adjutant general was directed to use such means to
suppress it as he saw fit. Palmer was arrested and held without charges.
On an application for a habeas corpus, the demurrer was sustained. There
was no denial of due process under the 14th Amendment. An appeal was
taken Jo the C1cuit Court of Appeals but the question had become moot, it
being conceded that violence and tumult had ceased. The court gave no in-
dication of its views. 29 Fed. (2d) 541 (C. A. A. 8th, 1928).
."Moyer v. Peabody, 148 Fed. 870 (D. Colo. 1906).
'212 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 235 (1909).
8
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"The facts that we are to assume are that a state of in-
surrection existed and that the Governor, without sufficient
reason but in good faith, in the course of putting the in-
surrection down held the plaintiff until he thought that he
safely could release him ....
"In such a situation we must assume that he had a right
under the state constitution and laws to call out troops, as
was held by the Supreme Court of the State .... That means
that he shall make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that
end; that he may kill persons who resist and, of course, that
he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those
whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace.
Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by
way of precaution to prevent the exercise of hostile power.
So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the
honest belief that they are needed in order to head the in-
surrection off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be
subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground
that he had not reasonable ground for his belief." (Italics
the author's).
This principle had been declared in Martin v. Mott' by Mr.
Justice Story; the same principle has been in effect since Luther
v. Borden.'
During the martial rule in Montana in 1914, sentences im-
posing punishment upon civilians were reversed by the state su-
preme court.
In 1902 the Governor of Pennsylvania called on the militia
to put an end to alleged violence in Schuylkill county. A private
soldier, posted as a sentinel, was prosecuted for murder, in kill-
ing a person while carrying out orders of his superior officer.
He was held blameless by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvnia.
In West Virginia, beginning in 1912, four "wars" have been
declared by proclamations of the Governors. Governor Glasscock
declared a state of war to exist in Paint Creek magisterial dis-
trict of Kanawha County, and he also appointed a military con-
mission to sit in a territory corresponding in area to the district.
The commission convicted certain persons of offenses and con-
fined them in the State penitentiary. On habeas corpus proceed-
n 12 Wheat. 19, 6 L. ed. 537 (1827).
Supra n. 15.
Ez parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947 (1914) ; Herlihy v. Don-
ohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 Pac. 164 (1916).
2 Commonwealth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. St. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903).
9
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ings in the Supreme Court of Appeals, the writs were denied,
one judge dissenting.'
The- Constitution of West Virginia provides:
Article I, Section 3:
"The provisions of the Constitution of the United States,
and of this State, are operative alike in a period of war as
in time of peace, and any departure, therefrom, or violation
thereof, under the plea of necessity, or any other plea, is sub-
versive of good government, and tends to anarchy and
despotism";
Article III, Section 4:
"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended .... ;
Article III, Section 12:
.... "The military shall be subordinate to the civil power;
and no citizen, unless engaged in the military service of the
State, shall be tried or punished by any military court, for
any offence that is cognizable by the civil courts of the
State .... ;
Article VII, Section 12:
"The Governor shall be commander-in-chief of the mili-
tary forces of the State (except when they shall be called
into the service of the United States), and may call out the
same to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and repel in-
vasion".
The Code provides inter alia:
.. .. "In the event of invasion, insurrection, rebellion
or riot, the commander-in-chief may in his discretion declare
a state of war in the towns, cities, districts or counties where
such disturbances exist.' '
The reasoning of the court may be gathered from some ex-
cerpts from the opinion written by Judge Poffenbarger:
"It seems to be conceded that if the governor has the
power to declare a state of war, his action in doing so is not
"State ex rel. Nance v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912). See
also Ez parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913). See also Hatfield
v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533 (1914); Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W.
Va. 713, 108 S. E. 428 (1921).
4W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 15, art. 1, § 83.
10
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reviewable by the courts. Of the correctness of this view,
we have no doubt ....
"Subject to the jurisdiction and powers of the federal
government, as delegated or surrendered up by the provi-
sions of the federal Constitution, this state is sovereign and
has the powers of a sovereign state. Like all others, it must
have the power to preserve itself .... "
As to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus the court
said:
"There is no court with power to grant or enforce the
writ of habeas corpus within the limits of such territory ....
In these disturbed areas, the paralyzed civil authority can
neither enforce nor suspend the writ of habeas corpus, nor
try citizens for offenses nor sustain a relation of either su-
premacy or subordination to the military power, for in a
practical sense it has ceased . .. ."
The court declined to review the sentences complained of, con-
tenting itself with deciding solely the question of legality and
leaving open the question of right to imprison after the restoration
of the civil status. Judge Robinson filed a rather vehement dis-
sent. This decision is adverted to at length because a recent
writer, Charles Fairman, says: "It is a far cry from the spirit
of the Milligan opinion to the views entertained by the Supreme
Court of West Virginia in 1912-1914, when an exercise of martial
rule was challenged before that tribunal.' Is this criticism
sound? Since the Milligan opinion and before the Nance case,
the Supreme Court of the United States had decided Moyer v.
Peabody' in which case it was held that it was the right of the
Governor to declare that a state of insurrection existed and that
his judgment could not be reviewed by the courts. In the Moyer
case Moyer had been arrested and confined, yet the Supreme
Court said that when the state of insurrection had been declared,
the Governor could call out the troops and, said Mr. Justice
Holmes: "That means that- he shall make the ordinary use of
soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist and, of
course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies
of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring
peace."
In the Nance case the bodies were seized, and instead of be-
THE LAW OP MAETIAL RULE (1930) 152,
Oupra )a. 19,
11
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ing merely held in confinement without trial, as in the Moyer case,
the persons were tried, convicted and sent to the penitentiary.
It is submitted the Nance procedure was legal under the Moyer
opinion. With the restoration of peace Nance et al., were
pardoned.
In Galveston, Texas, a citizen had been tried and convicted
by a provost judge, during a period of martial law, in which the
military commander had displaced the city commission and the
local judges. A petition for a habeas corp4us was denied.'
In Nebraska terms of imprisonment in the county jail had
been imposed on persons by the military, which had been called
for by the Governor during a state of lawlessness and disorder
beyond the control of the civil authorities. Habeas corpus was
denied.'
The recent case of Constantin v. Smith decided by a Federal
Court in Texas was a suit brought about because the Governor
of Texas had attempted to take over the oil industry, in further-
ance of which policy he by fiat had declared martial war because
the owner of the wells might become enraged and commit acts of
violence, thereby depriving plaintiffs of their property without
due process. A federal statutory three-judge court had an ap-
plication for an injunction against the Railroad Commission of
Texas, to which Governor Sterling and others were also parties.
Said the court: "It was conceded that at no time has there been
any actual uprising in the territory. At no time had any military
force been exerted to put riots or mobs down." "The only in-
surrection or riot in the territory was, not one of fact, but by
fiat." The case involved the right of a citizen to relief against
the acts depriving him of his property, and the question of mar-
tial law was merely incidental.
The Boer War Cases, the South African Cases During
the World War and the Cases of the Irish
Rebellion of 1920
To examine these cases here at length would unduly prolong
this paper.
The Boer War cases, which are collected in the footnote, be-
"U. S. v. Wolterp, 268 Fed. 69 (S. D. Tex. 1920).
U. S. v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 208 (D. Neb. 1922).
57 Fed. (2d) 227 (E. D, T@x. 1932),
12
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gin about 1900.' They are positive that even-though the courts
are open, martfal law may then exist in the event of necessity.
Fourie was arrested and tried during an actual state of war, but
in a district from which the civil magistrate had been expelled.
Bekker was arrested and tried where the magistrates were sit-
ting, after comparative calm had been restored to that district.
Smith, a soldier, was acquitted because he had carried out the
military order of his superior officer. In the Marais case the
court said: ". . . . M rtial law had been proclaimed over the dis-
trict in which the petitioner was arrested and the district to which
he was removed. The fact that for some purposes some tribunals
had been permitted to pursue their ordinary course is not con-
clusive that war was not raging."
The Krohn case arose during the World War. Martial law
had been proclaimed on October 12, 1914, throughout the country.
Krohn, a builder and contractor, residing in Pretoria, had been
arrested and detained under the proclamation. He was indicted
for using seditious language. Jurisdiction to try was in the mili-
tary court. All the civil courts being open, Krohn applied to the
Transvaal Provincial Division for an interdict restraining any
form of trial proceeding by this special court, on the ground that
it had no authority to exercise judicial functions, or to try him,
or any other person. His application was dismissed. He ap-
pealed against that judgment. The reasoning of the court may
be gathered by the following from the opinion:
".... . there is an inherent right in every State, as in every
individual to use all means at its disposal to defend itself
when its existence is at stake; when the force upon which the
courts depend and upon which the constitution is based is
itself challenged. Under such circumstances, the State may
be compelled by necessity to disregard for a time the ordinary
safeguards of liberty in defense of liberty itself, and to sub-
stitute for the careful and deliberate procedure of the law a
machinery more drastic and speedy in order to cope with an
urgent danger. Such a condition of things may be brought
about by war, rebellion or civil commotion; and the deter-
nRe Fourie, 17 Cape of Good Hope Sup. Ct. Rep. 173 (1900); Queen v.
Gildenhuys, 17 Cape of Good Hope Sup. Ct. Rep. 266 (1900); Queen v. Bek-
ker, 17 Cape of Good Hope Sup. Ct. Rep. 340 (1900); Queen v. Smith, 17
Cape of Good Hope Sup. Ct. Rep. 561 (1900); Umbilini v. General Officer
Commanding, 21 Natal Law Rep. 169 (1900); Jacobs v. General Officer Com-
manding, 21 Natal Law Rep. 157 (1900); Mgomini v. Governor (1906) 22
Times Law Rep. 413; Marais v. General Officer Commanding, 15 Times Law
Rep. 185, A. C. 109 (1901); Krohn v, Minister for l)efense, South Afrieau
Rep., A. P. 191 (1915),
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mination of the State to defend itself is announced by the
proclamation of martial law. But, in the absence of stat-
utory provision upon the subject, - and none exists here -
such a proclamation clothes the government with no author-
ity, and invests it with no power which it did not possess be-
fore. The right to use all force necessary to protect itself,
whether against external or internal attack, is an inherent
right. The proclamation is merely a notification to all con-
cerned, that the right in question is about to be exercised and
upon certain lines."
War was actually raging in the district when and where Krohn
was arrested. That was sufficient.
The Marais case is perhaps the most important of the Boer
War cases, and it held flatly that the fact that for some purposes
some courts are permitted to sit, is not conclusive that war is not
raging.' To put the proposition in other language: the mere
fact that the law courts were sitting did not preclude martial
law. This was applied in the case in the Natal Rebellion of 1906.
In Krohi? v. Minister for Defense all the courts were open.' Mar-
tial law was declared, however, throughout the Union of South
Africa because of the German invasion and the October, 1914,
rebellion. Krohn was arrested and confined, charged with sedi-
tious utterances. He attempted to secure an interdict restrain-
ing the authorities from proceeding with the trial. He lost, and
on appeal, lost again. The fact that all the courts were open made
no difference. War was actually raging in the district when and
where Krohn was arrested. That was sufficient.
The Irish cases are as positive as the South African cases."
The declaration of martial law in Ireland, however, had been
made by legislative sanction.
The Powers of the President
With this brief review, let us come to the powers of the Presi-
dent of the United States.
From the foregoing cases arising in the states, it would seem
plain that when the governor of a state in time of disturbance de-
clares a state or district therein to be in a state of insurrection,
3Supra n. 31.
3Supra a. 31.
" King v. Allen, (1921) 2 Ir. Law Rep., K. B. Div. 241; Egan v. Mac-
ready, (1921) 1 Ir. Law Rep., Chan. Div. 265; King (Garde) v. Strickland,
(1921) 2 Ir. Law Rep. 317; King (Ronayne and Mulcady) v. Strickland,
(1921) 2 Ir. Law Rep., K. B. Div. 333; King (Childers) v. Officer Comn-
manding, (1922) 1 Ir. Law Rep., Chan, Div. 5,
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the power to review such declaration is denied to the courts and
that if the militia be called out under such circumstances, military
law with all of its consequences follows. But let us go a step
farther. Suppose the Governor does not take action and an
emergency arises? *What powers has the President of the United
States in such cases?
Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution of the United
States provides:
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a republican form of government, and shall pro-
tect each of them against invasion; and on application of the
Legislature, or of the executive (when the Legislature can-
not be convened) against domestic violence."
The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
and of the Militia when in the actual service of the United
States.' Congress is empowered to provide for calling out the
militia to execute the laws of the United States, suppress insur-
rection and repel invasions.' The provisions of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended unless, when in cases of rebellion
or invasion, the public safety may require it.' He is enjoined to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'
The President is authorized in case of insurrection in any
State, against the government thereof,
" ... on application of the legislature of such State, or of
the .executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, to
call forth such number of the militia of any other State or
States, which may be applied for, as he deems sufficient to
suppress such insurrection; or, on like application, to em-
ploy, for the same purposes, such part of the land or naval
forces of the United States as he deems necessary."
"Whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, com-
binations, or assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the
authority of the Government of the United States, it shall
become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to
enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the
laws of the United States within any State or Territory, it
shall be lawful for the President to call forth the militia of
any or all the States, and to employ such parts of the land
and naval forces of the United States as he may deem neces-
"U. S. Const., art. 2, § 2, cl. 1.
Ibid., art. 1, § 8, el. 15.
-Ibid., art. 1, § 9, el. 2.
"fbid., art. 2, 3.
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sary to enforce the faithful execution of the laws of the
United States, or to suppress such rebellion, in whatever
State or Territory thereof the laws of the United States may
be forcibly opposed, or the execution thereof forcibly ob-
structed."
"Whenever insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
combinations, or conspiracies in any State so obstructs or
hinders the execution of the laws thereof, and of the United
States, as to deprive any portion or class of the people of
such State of any of the rights, privileges, or immunities, or
protection, named in the Constitution and secured by the
laws for the protection of such rights, privileges, or immun-
ities, and the constituted authorities of such State are unable
to protect, or, from any cause, fail in or refuse protection of
the people in such rights, such facts shall be deemed a denial
by such State of the equal protection of the laws to which
they are entitled under the Constitution of the United
States; and in all such cases, or whenever any such insur-
rection, violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy, op-
poses or obstructs the laws of the United States, or the due
execution thereof or impedes or obstructs the due course of
justice under the same, it shall be lawful for the President,
and it shall be his duty, to take such measures, by the em-
ployment of the militia, or the land and naval forces of the
United States, or of either, or by other means, as he may
deem necessary, for the suppression of such insurrection,
domestic violence, or combinations."
"Whenever, in the judgment of the President, it becomes
necessary to use the military forces under this chapter, the
President shall forthwith, by proclamation, command the in-
surgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective
abodes, within a limited time. '
The President is also authorized to suspend commercial inter-
course with the State in insurrection," and to provide prohibi-
tions and conditions of commercial intercourse on the part of the
State not declared to be in a state of insurrection," which may
take the form of a license or permit." The Secretary of the
Treasury may appoint officers to carry into effect such licenses,
rules and regulations.' Heavy penalties are provided," including
confiscation of property employed to aid insurrection."
-50 U. S. C. A. §§ 201 - 204 (1926).
o I-bid. § 205.
"Ibid. § 206.
"Ibid. §§ 207, 208.
"Ibid. § 209.
" Ibid. § 210.
4Ibid. § 212. 8 U. S. C. A. § 51, 52 (1926) authorize the use of military
power in aid of the execution of warrants and other judicial process. Army
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The above does not constitute a complete enumeration of the
powers of the President. Enough has been given to indicate that
without the request of the state through its governor or its legis-
lature, or even over the protest of the state authorities, in time
of insurrection or domestic trouble, the President, to protect fed-
eral rights and to accomplish federal duties, is clothed with ample
power to send the military forces into sections of the United
States to put down insurrection and to reestablish order, peace
and concord.
Again, it seems necessary to repeat here what has been said
about the power and discretion of the governors. The decision
whether or not the situation requires such steps is solely with
the President." He first makes the proclamation required by
statute.' After that is done, the National Government has the
right to use physical force in any part of the United States to
compel obedience to its laws, and to carry into execution the
powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.
In the Debs case,'" Mr. Justice Brewer used this language:
"We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle, that the govern-
ment of the United States may, by means of physical force, ex-
ercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of Amer-
ican soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This neces-
sarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and
hence the power to keep the peace to that extent." (Author's
italics).
It is unthinkable that such a declaration will ever be modified,
especially in view of the provisions of the United States Con-
stitution that "This Constitution, and the laws of the United
Regulations, Paragraph 487 provides:
"If time will admit, application for the use of troops for such purposes
must be forwarded, with statements of all material facts, for the considera-
tion and action of the President; but in case of sudden and unexpected in-
vasion, insurrection or riot, endangering the public property of the United
States, or in-case of attempted or threatened robbery or interruption of the
United States mails, or any other equivalent emergency so imminent as to
render it dangerous to await instructions requested through the speediest
means of communication, an officer of the Army may take such action be-
fore the receipt of instructions as the circumstances of the case and the law
under which he is acting may justify, and will promptly report his action
and the circumstances requiring it to The Adjutant General of the Army,
by telegraph, if possible, for the information of the President."
The militia or national guard of a State has never yet been called into
service by the President as authorized by 50 U. S. C. A. § 201 (1926).
'1 Martin v. Mott, supra n. 20.
'150 U. S. C. A. § 204 (1926).
"In re Debs, 158 U, S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900 (1893).
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States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution
or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."'" The
Judges of the State courts take oath of office to support the Con-
stitution of the United States.
The problem, then, seems to be solved, and in the light of
unimpeachable authority. When a district is declared by the
President in the Proclamation to be in a state of insurrection,
the militia can be sent in - and actual martial law put in force
and effect in the zone of the declaration. A condition termed
in this paper martial rule, as contra-distinguished from martial
law, can probably be put in force and effect in such zones near
the zones of declaration as are, in the judgment of the President
or the military commander, necessary to render fully effective
the zones of declaration. In these zones of martial rule, which
may roughly be compared to what is known as a "state of seige"
in Europe, we would probably have a mixed situation in which
the commander could either try by military commission, or avail
himself of the existing courts and judges as a means of trial. The
federal law recognizes courts-martial and military commissions.
Courts-martial are concomitant with the Army and its rule under
the Articles of War. Military commissions are distinct tribunals
from courts-martial.' The jurisdiction of a military commission
extends to civilians, especially .with respect to the trial of crimes
peculiar in time of war.
In the Nance case Judge Poffenbarger used this language:
"Power to establish a military commission for the punishment of
offenses committed within the military zone is challenged in argu-
ment; but we think such a commission is a recognized and neces-
sary incident and instrumentality of martial government.""
He might have added that the means necessary in one zone
might be harsh or wholly inadequate in another zone. Circum-
stances easily can be imagined where it would be entirely proper
in a zone to supersede the governor of a state; to levy, collect and
expend the taxes; to take charge of the finances of the state, in-
cluding the supervision of the banks; to try and punish for of-
"9Art. 6, par. 2.
5oWiNTmOP ON MiLITARY Lw (2d ed. 1896) 831.
1 Supra n. 24.
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fenses; to put an embargo upon communications, and to resort
to other measures that to a free people in a free state would be
more than abhorrent. But the answer is: the government is
supreme in its rights to preserve itself.
During the Civil War, it is said in Winthrop's Military
Law,, the military commissions acting under the authority of the
United States entered judgment in several thousand cases. Sich
a commission tried the Lincoln conspirators, as well as Milligan.
A military commission is not part of the judicial system. Its
judgments are not reviewable by certiorari.' It has no civil juris-
diction."
A trial by martial law is purely an executive act, and for
matters within its jurisdiction it is not even necessary that a
written record of its proceedings be kept, "the record being it-
self the official and operative order which the judgment de-
mands. ' '
The matters within the jurisdiction of military commissions
are ordinarily offenses against the laws of war and the safety of
the army and of the state, and civil crimes which, where the or-
dinary courts have ceased to function, cannot be tried normally."'
If the civil courts can function, the proclamation of martial law
does not suspend them." In the Nance case it was said: "In these
" (2d ed. 1896) 1302.
3Ez parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 742, 17 L. ed. 589 (1863).
";40 Cioc. 391, n. 41.
",Morgan, MartiaZ Law, 14 ENcYL. BRITANNICA (14th ed., 1929) 984.
wAtt'y General v. Van Reenen, 89 The Law Times Reports 591 (1903)
(appeal from the Supreme Court of Cape Colony). Van Reenen had been
convicted of moving himself and certain property to and fro in Malmesbury
district without proper authority. The charges were heard before a magis-
trate - where the accused pleaded guilty and was fined and imprisoned. The
magistrate made no record of the trial. He did note the charges, judgment
and sentence "upon a piece of paper purporting to be the form generally
used in the hearing of charges under the ordinary jurisdiction of a resident
magistrate." The Supreme Court of the Colony of Good Hope reversed be-
cause of the defective form of the record. On appeal Lord Chancellor Hals-
bury in reversing the Supreme Court of the Colony said:
"The truth is that the whole matter rests upon the initial mistake of call-
ing the memorandum a "record", and treating it as if it were a record of
a court of justice. There would be no necessity, certainly in point of law,
and probably not in practice, to have a written memorandum of each sen-
tence, or judgment, of the martial law court; certainly no such principle
applies as is known to the courts of ordinary criminal jurisdiction in respect
of records, the record being itself the official and operative order which the
judgment demands."
W F RmuAN, LAw o MARTIAL RULE (1930) 201.
rIn Te State ex rel. Baratana Land Co., 138 La. 428, 70 So. 423 (1915);
County of Christian v. Merrigan, 191 Dl1. 484, 61 N. E. 479 (1901); State
ex rel. Nance v. Brown, supra n. 24.
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disturbed areas, the paralyzed civil authority can neither enforce
nor suspend the writ of habeas corpus, nor try citizens for of-
fenses, nor sustain a relation of either supremacy or subordina-
tion" to the military power, for in a practical sense it has
ceased.' '" That this view is by no means new is shown by the
decisions during The Boer War. In Queen v. Bekker' Justice
Maasdorp said: "There is abundant authority for saying that
there is nothing to prevent the military, while administering mar-
tial law, from allowing the Courts of law to take cognizance of
matters which do not clash or conflict with the proceedings of
court-martial. The existence of such civil courts is no proof that
martial law has become unnecessary."
The Milligan case" simply adopted what had been the pro-
nounced law in the British Empire. Since then, the Supreme
Court of the United States had had no occasion directly to review
that decision. It may be arguable that the Moyer case has placed
limitations upon the doctrine of the Milligan case. In the British
Empire since the Milligan case, the question has arisen in num-
erous cases, and many modifications have been made. Especially
is this true in the Boer War cases. A quotation from the opinion
of Buchanan J. in Queen v. Bekker will suffice: " .... I do not
concur in the contention of counsel that because certain of the
courts are open therefore martial law cannot exist. As we know
in one part of this Colony a court was recently actually engaged
in criminal trials by jury to the accompaniment of a bombard-
ment, and yet it was admitted that martial law was necessary and
was in fact in force at the time at the same place. The courts
must not only be open, but also to the full, proper and unobstruct-
ed exercise of their jurisdiction."
Conclusion
The cases here referred to mark a long advance from the
holdings in effect at the time of the Milligan case that if the
courts are open, there is a state of peace, which denies jurisdiction
to the military commissions. It is very cautiously believed that
some modification of the doctrine of the Milligan case would be
11 Supra n. 24.
0Supra n. 31.
"Bupra n. 7.
Supra n. 19.
1Supra n. 31.
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made were the question again to be passed upon by the Supreme
Court.
A probable solution would be for Congress to pass a statute
giving special powers to the militia, but imposing conditions on
its exercise as was done in Ireland in Egan v. Gen'l Macready.e"
The extent of the powers would, no doubt, be matter for serious
differences of opinion save in time -of war. In the last analysis,
in time of war, military law is the will of the executive - the ex-
ecutive is the commander-in-chief. With respect to times of in-
surrection, at least two points are clear. The Colorado, Idaho and
West Virginia cases agree that the proclamation of the Governor
that an insurrection exists in conclusive. The United States
Supreme Court in the case of Moyer v. Peabody' also holds this.
So do the Irish and the South African cases. It is conceded,
moreover, that insurrections can be met with military force. In
fact all the cases sustain this view. The United States Supreme
Court in the Moyer case said that all the ordinary means of sol-
diers could be adopted, -even to the extent of taking life. In
Idaho and Colorado, the ones arrested were not tried but were
placed in detention camps. In West Virginia, they were tried by
the military courts and imprisoned. The difference is only one
of degree, not of method. The military will be upheld in such
cases. But the degree to which they are upheld is a debatable
point. It is manifest that the soldiers must have greater powers
than the police - and must be protected in obedience to lawful
orders of a superior. Whether it is necessary to have actual war
powers in such cases of insurrection, at present remains a debat-
able point.
The usual habeas corpus provision in state constitutions pro-
hibiting its suspension will avail little, for if the courts cannot
function or do so imperfectly - the right to the writ is bootless
- it cannot be enforced. Insurrection may be synonymous with
war; it may not be. In West Virginia, a war was declared. The
difference, if any, may be entirely visionary and if any difference
exists, the lesser degree may in a few moments be changed by the
actual conditions on the ground.
The Government has the right to live and, it is submitted, if
it has the power, such power may be exercised. The dangers
arising from domestic disorder are not those that arise from war,
"Supra n. 34.
csSupra n. 19.
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but such dangers are more constant. Legislatures could provide
in a large measure for protection therefrom. In this way, a
means could probably be worked out that would preserve the
fundamentals of government, and the basic law and its adminis.
tration even in times of domestic disorder. "'Tis a consumma-
tion devoutly to be wished." The accused is always entitled to
a fair trial.
Upon the termination of the emergency it would seem to be
reasonable that the sentences imposed by the military commissions
should cease. But there is authority that the "establishment of
peace" does not terminate them. ' The sentences were valid when
imposed, and the argument is that they do not cease to be valid
because the emergency has ceased to exist. In West Virginia
pardons were given to those sent to the penitentiary by the mili-
tary commission. Whether sentences expire with the emergency
has not been adjudicated in the state.
In obeying a superior officer, the inferior may be faced with
a number of situations. He may in carrying out the order do
an act that any person of ordinary intelligence should know was
illegal. In such circumstances he has been held liable, as in Man-
ley v. State,' where the soldier in carrying out his orders-to keep
back a crowd, when the President was visiting, bayonetted a man
who endeavored to cross his path. Again, as in the Shorta~l case
in Pennsylvania,' his act may be lawful and not needlessly severe,
or he might be in the situation of participating when he could
not have known of any illegal end in view. In Riggs v. State'
the accused soldier was summoned by his captain for scouting
duty. They went to a house and when the individual who lived
there was found, he was killed, apparently without any justifica..
tion or excuse. As it was not shown that the solder aided or
abetted in the killing, his conviction was reversed.
If the soldier acts with good motives in obeying the orders
of his military superior, the plaintiff is usually left without a
civil remedy. Thus in West Virginia the court has held that
suppressing a newspaper outside the zone or theatre of war, but
circulating in the zone, papers carrying articles opposed to the
06Supra n. 29.6762 Texas Crim. 392, 137 S. W. 1137 (1911); 69 Tex. Crim. 502, 154 S.
W. 1008 (1913).
"Commonwealth v. Shortall, supra n. 23.
193 Cold. 85 (Tenn. 1866).
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1932], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss1/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Governor's policy, is so protected.n If as in some cases, damages
are recovered, they may be reimbursed out of the public treasury,
as was done in Mitchell v. Harmony.'
The situation, however, must be judged by the facts as they
appeared at the moment to the man on the spot, and not in the
light of subsequent events.
It is believed that authority sufficient has been shown in this
paper to convince one that the Federal government is full handed
in cases of domestic disturbance. Certain it seems that if such
occasion arise, the Government would not ponder as in the
familiar fourteenth century story of the philosophical donkey
owned by a Frenchman, one Jean Buridan. The donkey being
equally hungry and thirsty, was placed half way between a bag
of oats and a bucket of water. It contemplated both without be-
ing able to decide for the water or the oats, and it is said it wasted
away and died.'
70 Hatfield v. Graham, supra n. 24.
713 How. 115, 14 L. ed. 75 (1851).
72The research for this paper was done in the law library of the Supreme
Court of Ohio in Columbus; the South African, the Irish and the fEnglish
cases were studied in the law library of Ohio State University in Columbus,
Ohio.
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